PICTURE this, we heard recently from Thabo Mbeki that Zimbabwe at some point could have been a recipient of globally sanctioned military force.
Thanks to some internal settlement, Zimbabweans found each other and notched a marriage of inconvenience, the General Political Agreement between 2009 and 2013.
Zimbabwe’s political formations, the two MDC formations and Zanu PF, avoided what was to happen in Libya under Resolution 1973 (2011) where, for the first time, the United Nations (UN) authorised the use of military force to protect citizens against a functioning de jure government.
Libya presented Africa with a clear example of what could have happened to Zimbabwe had the political formations decided to remain abrasive.
Of course, we also factor in the grand politics played by the permanent five members (P-5) in the UN Security Council (UNSC). But Libya’s case left a precedent that the international politics of military force has now been significantly altered.
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its friends, Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector were to gain traction through the revised R2P under human security. The domestic version of the R2P was used by Zimbabwe in 2017 when an evolutionary coup was carried out under the human security justification.
This domestic version seems to have been copied by Sudan. To some extent, the abandonment of civilian rule in Burkina Faso, Niger and so forth loosely fits in this version.
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While Zimbabwe seems to be currently engulfed in a state of electoral or information warfare, some kind of hybrid warfare, it appears the international community is in the age of humanitarian wars.
Such wars are of course modified by states using technical and security apparatus available to them. Resolution 1973 created an impromptu declaration of international war against Libya under Odyssey Dawn.
Eighteen countries including Morocco, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar and United Arab Emirates participated. The international community suddenly witnessed a series of bombings and flights in Libya.
Libya denounced the strikes and the No-Fly Zone as a malicious act by crusader enemies which targeted civilians. This was the first act by the UNSC to use force against the will of a de jure government. The UNSC had not done so in Somalia, Rwanda or Haiti.
Zimbabwe was to declare persona non grata to those that showed allegiance with the National Transition Council that replaced Gaddafi. This was also largely in line with China’s five principles of foreign policy and Russia’s foreign policy which did not support military force.
Militarily, Zimbabwe had also benefited from Russia and China. It can be said that Zimbabwe’s political survival is attributed to grand diplomatic manoeuvre where its warring political parties find each other using both extrinsic and intrinsic negotiating apparatus.
Why focus on malleability of politics?
The focus on malleability of Zimbabwean politics focuses on the nation’s historical context and current political dynamics. Zimbabwe has experienced unprecedented political upheavals, including a blood bath during periods of authoritarian rule under Robert Mugabe and subsequent attempts at democratic reform.
In this maze, military intervention first came in velvet gloves under the “Straight Jacket” military politics when Mugabe lost to Tsvangirai in the presidential elections in March 2008.
Conflation between military and Zanu PF was camouflaged with confusion at that time. Fast forward to 2017 and backed by a politically framed constitution that broadly refers to liberation war, the military intervention in 2017 was carried out to prevent threats to domestic stability.
Many felt this event was some “Second Mgagao Declaration” to install Mugabe’s successor in the same way the First Mgagao Declaration had expressly installed Mugabe, who was anti-detente, to replace the pro-detente, Ndabaningi Sithole.
The Operation Restore Legacy in 2017 was framed in some ways similar to the Operation Sovereign Legitimacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
This is something close to safeguarding the sovereignty of liberation movements. As such, the military intervention in Zimbabwe’s politics either by Zimbabwe’s or any external forces raises questions about the stability and governance of the country, prompting analysis and discussion on its malleability.
In that event, comparing Zimbabwe’s situation to Libya’s is valid and critical in understanding different responses to political crises and interventions.
While Zimbabwe survived military intervention, the aftermath and implications for its political landscape are still subjects of scrutiny and analysis.
The malleable part of Zim politics
The malleability of Zimbabwean politics is being used here to describe the country’s political system’s capacity to change, adapt, or be influenced by various centrifugal and centripetal forces over time.
We can first refer to the pre-independence factions, such as Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) under Sithole and Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) under Joshua Nkomo, which vied for political power and influence.
It has been noted that the two private institutions had assets that were of substantial value. The malleability of politics at that time was evident in the shifting alliances, ideological rebellions, and strategies of survival and liberation from colonial rule employed by each political party.
Under Mugabe’s rule, instances of political repression, economic mismanagement and human rights abuses were competing with early promises of reconciliation and nation building.
Mugabe’s regime became increasingly authoritarian, leading to pronounced factionalism, purges within Zanu PF and attempts to suppress dissent within and outside Zanu PF. Competition between those referring the G40 as cabals and those calling them mere factional leaders also emerged.
The malleability of politics under Mugabe was seen in how Mugabe overstayed his welcome by playing the factions against each other from the Emmerson Mnangagwa-Solomon/Joice Mujuru to the G40-Lacoste faction.
In this way, he consolidated his power, including through allegations of electoral manipulation and the silencing of opposition voices. In part, a weaker and sometimes divided opposition also gave Mugabe some backing vocalists.
In 2018 August, security forces in Zimbabwe allegedly opened fire on opposition protesters, killing six civilians. This event marked the fragility of Zimbabwe’s political climate and the government’s willingness to use violence to maintain control.
The malleability of politics was evident in the vindictive response which sparked international condemnation. Worse still, a commission that was established could not proffer conclusive evidence as to who had killed the civilians.
Concern also remains as to how the victims and their families can have closure in the same way victims of Matabeleland and Midlands Disturbances (Gukurahundi), victims of fast track land reform and other episodes of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial injustices need to achieve closure.
The emerging and seemingly endemic crisis is now the electoral wars. Zimbabwe’s electoral wars have been contentious and sometimes violent due to allegations of fraud, intimidation, and voter suppression.
From Canaan Banana and Mugabe’s eras to the presidency of Mnangagwa, electoral processes have been marred by irregularities and political manipulation. The malleability of evident in the recurring challenges to the legitimacy of electoral outcomes and the ongoing struggle for democratic governance.
Whither the opposition’s errors
Zimbabwe’s opposition has made strategic errors over the years, reducing its chances of unseating Zanu PF in many ways. First, Morgan Tsvangirai’s decision on the participation in the senatorial elections in 2005 weakened the opposition as it departed from its original stance of shunning undemocratic institutions.
The participation tainted the opposition’s credibility among supporters. This was to be the opposition’s stance in participating in elections without meaningful reforms.
The next error was the opposition’s failure to stabilise Welshman Ncube’s MDC. The 2005 split resulted in the Tsvangirai and Ncube factions. The division diluted the opposition. While Ncube’s original MDC remained, many MDCs with nicknames such as 1999, Tsvangirai and Alliance emerged. They gave Zanu PF some lifeline. Even when the MDCs united during the Government of National Unity (GNU), they accepted meaningless ministerial portfolios.
The chief threat to a powerful opposition was co-optation, which compromised the opposition’s independence and credibility. The aftermath was the opposition’s failure to campaign effectively in the rural areas, where Zanu PF has traditionally maintained gripping power.
The failure to effectively engage rural voters, who are a large part of the electorate or actual voters sometimes waters down the allegations of electoral fraud.
While in 2008 Zanu PF lost because of a sympathy vote after the unprecedented violence in the June presidential runoff, the same cannot be said about 2013, 2018 and 2023. Physical violence has remarkably been replaced by hybrid warfare.
In this puzzle, the military renewal efforts by Zanu PF in 2017 were strategically couched as some popular protests against Mugabe’s rule. The opposition unanimously supported the impeachment and charge sheets that led to Mugabe’ resignation.
This was so even if it was clear that Mugabe was old and would be defeated by the opposition with ease. The opposition’s support to the military, which has clearly shown its readiness to defend Zanu PF’s own internal machinations raised questions about the opposition’s commitment to democratic principles.
It was turning the opposition members into pseudo-charlatans, who willingly collaborated with some selected elements of the ruling party. When Zanu PF used people outside power structures like Joseph Chinotimba’s assertion that Zanu PF removed Mugabe alone, this was a simple mark of strategic whipping of the opposition.
The CCC ambiguity strategy
I might end with a note on the strategic ambiguity of the Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) that was formed in 2022 as a coalition of opposition, citizen society groups and citizen formations.
The strategic ambiguity has been vainly if not lamely criticised for its lack of clear policy direction. This made the CCC redundant,
including through allegations of infiltration by proxy members, such as Sengezo Tshabangu and the resignation of its founding president, Nelson Chamisa.
While the CCC represented a united front against Zanu PF, in terms of having succeeded in denying the ruling party's two-thirds majority in Parliament, its ability to articulate a coherent alternative vision for Zimbabwe’s future of democratic governance has never been clear.
What of Chamisa’s resignation?
The strategic ambiguity adopted by CCC, has remained part of grand politics in Zimbabwe. While the ordinary eye thinks the CCC was destroyed, realist politicians can pick several implications on how the strategy has seismically shifted the opposition’s approach to challenging Zanu PF’s dominance.
Firstly, it has unearthed proxy institutions and infiltration. Chamisa has managed to use the strategy of ambiguity as a defensive mechanism against a political party in government in forceful ways.
Chamisa got more than 1,9 million votes without structures, and in a space of a year after the formation of his party. By gaining traction without revealing all his cards, the Zanu PF government was forced to call for by-elections even in areas where the recalls of CCC parliamentarians were still before the courts of law.
Secondly, Zanu PF’s key government official, Chris Mutsvangwa, before he was removed as War Veterans minister, celebrated Chamisa’s departure from the CCC.
His suggestion that the CCC members, who remained to run the party without Chamisa, whom he said had dictatorial tendencies, had to be congratulated indicates Zanu PF’s governmental perception of the opposition’s internal dynamics.
Put simply, it is a hammer fist blow to Zanu PF’s floating ribs. It is from Chamisa’s blitzkrieg resignation stance and its effect on the election case before Sadc that Mutsvangwa was strategically removed from his position.
Zanu PF had publicly acknowledged through Mutsvangwa’s confusion mastery and by reacting to developments within the opposition in celebratory tones that the Chamisa strategy was grand.
As such, Zanu PF publicly shot itself in the foot by publicly acknowledging the significance of Chamisa’s strategic ambiguity in keeping Zanu PF off balance and uncertain about its opponents’ intentions and strategies.
Thirdly, Chamisa’s resignation smacks of a strategic defeat of Zanu PF. Chamisa’s resignation from the CCC, while surprising to some in the ordinary political space of keyboard warriors and social media trollers, could be interpreted in grand political game theories as a strategic move akin to a blitzkrieg or lightning warfare.
This is no different from Chamisa’s strategy of a giraffe. One fatal kick can kill even a male lion, however ferocious it could be.
By stepping up the tone of his political leverage from formal party structures, Chamisa has left Zanu PF guessing from the need to invite him as official opposition member in parliament, imposing an age restriction, or regulating political parties.
Chamisa retains the ability to ignore bills that threaten civil society engagements and could even ignore diplomatic engagements on such processes, which could appear like the opposition has left it to diplomats to engage Zanu PF.
He retains the ability to participate in future processes, including potential elections, without being constrained by party affiliations or divisions.
Chamisa has even outsmarted litigants who could have given the courts the power to make a pronouncement on whether CCC had freely participated in the 2023 elections.
If the courts had made a pronouncement on that Brian something case, Sadc could have seen the election impasse as overtaken by events.
Further, the strategic impact was that Chamisa managed to outsmart strategic aspects relating to the Sadc case, and the possibility of party implosions following Job Sikhala’s release.
By implication, his untimely resignation is no different from the events in Sierra Leone, which I alluded to sometime last year when I indicated how a committed opposition can effortlessly bring the ruling party to the negotiating table.
- Hofisi is a disruptive and itinerary thinker with interest in law and transnational governance. — sharonhofii@gmail.com.
