Letters: Elections in 2023: Has Zim passed audit on pre-election process

By Amh Voices | May. 14, 2023

The election in 2023, however, takes place in a wholly different context to any of the previous polls.

Elections in Zimbabwe since 2000 have never passed the test of best practice.

Every election has led to electoral dispute in the courts and to negative reporting by reputable election observer groups.

However, the political context within each of the previous elections took place were all very different: some – 2000, 2005, & 2013 - took place after long periods where civil strife was absent, whilst others took place in a climate of economic turmoil or serious political violence (2002, 2008, and 2018).

In each of these elections, the pre-election periods were very different as were the polls.

However, apart from 2008, in every election was Zanu PF elected into government.

The election in 2023, however, takes place in a wholly different context to any of the previous polls.

Firstly, the country has not been in such dire circumstances before, with inflation rising rapidly, the economy sagging to unprecedented depths, food insecurity at world-beating levels, and most of the population living below the poverty line.

Scarcely the conditions in which a government is likely to be re-elected.

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Secondly, all the political forces in the country are in disarray.

Despite the rhetoric, both Zanu PF and the Citizens Coalition for Change are fragmented, fractious and deeply distrusted by the general population.

For example, the Afrobarometer survey in 2022 indicates that only 27% support Zanu PF, 26% the CCC, and 46% are “reticent” (would not vote, refused to answer, or don’t know).

With so much at stake, it is obvious that the quality of this election, and the effect that this can have in moving the country from international disfavour and re-engagement, matters enormously. It cannot be business as usual.

In order to determine whether these elections can meet the standards of best practice, the Sapes Trust and Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) have undertaken an audit of the pre-election conditions, and the probability that Zimbabwe will pass the test.

Over nine policy dialogues, 26 local, regional, and international election experts have discussed every aspect of the electoral process leading up to the poll later this year.

The discussions have ranged over the technical issues, such as the independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec), delimitation, and the voters’ roll, through the more citizen critical issues like political violence, press and media freedom, and the role of the courts in elections.

The audit of the pre-election environment

Analysis of the nine previous election policy dialogues was organised around the five pillars originally posed in the first dialogue in August 2022.

The conclusions from this dialogue were unanimously negative, pointing out that many recommendations for international observers from 2018 had been ignored, as had most of the recommendations made by the Election Resource Centre (ERC) and Zimbabwe Election Support Network (Zesn).

Between the participants, they posed the major problems:

The lack of independence in Zec remains a significant concern.
Voter registration remains a concern, both because of the low uptake by citizens and the difficulties in getting identity documents.

The non-availability of the voters’ roll and the impeding of independent audits remains a problem as in the past.

Voter education remains constrained and unduly controlled.

The extreme political polarisation in Zimbabwe creates unfavourable political tensions for the holding of peaceful elections, as well as making the likelihood of a level playing field remote.

Ten months later, it was evident from the discussion on May 4, 2023, that very little has changed.

The one aspect not covered in the initial discussion was delimitation, but as is evident from the two dialogues on delimitation, this has been wholly unsatisfactory: the report was disowned by a majority of the Zec commissioners, is the subject of court challenges, and analyses of the report indicate poor compliance with the constitution.

Additionally, the refusal by Zec to make the voters’ roll available for independent audit has similarly led to a court challenge.

The analysis of the five pillars – Information, Inclusion, Insulation, Integrity, and Irreversibility – and the assessment of these received general assent from the participants, although assigning a pass/Fail grade as the overall measure was felt to be insufficiently nuanced, as there had been some minor improvements.

The registration blitz, the relaxation of ID requirements, the partial opening on the media space (local radios), and the establishment of quotas for women and the youth were needed to be noted.

However, many problems were still evident.

Information:

This pillar refers to the openness of the media to reflecting the multiple perspectives of the electoral contestants.

It also refers to the need for a non-partisan state press and the media.

It also refers to the ability of citizens to engage with politicians and attend meetings and rallies without fear and constraint.

The issue being addressed here is the extent to which the basic freedoms are present for citizens in the pre-election period: speech, assembly, and association.

The following problems were identified in the dialogues:

Multiple recommendations have been made by domestic and international observers about the need to ensure a non-partisan state-owned press and media.

The degree to which journalists self-censor out of fear, and the risks in reporting and attending public meetings.

It was evident from the discussions that the freedoms of expression, movement, and association are severely restricted for the independent press and media.

Meetings of the CCC are banned or disrupted, sometimes violently.

The levels of hate speech, and the casting of opposition political parties as enemies precludes the notion that this is a competition to persuade the citizenry which party has the best policies to govern the country and meet their aspirations.

Citizens both fear elections and elect not to participate other than by voting.
The PVO Act will affect domestic observation of elections and the inhibiting of independent collection of data – especially about the counting of votes - about the election.

Inclusion:

Inclusion refers to the notion that elections are about free and equal participation in the electoral process.

It refers to the ability of citizens to register as voters, to obtain Information (directly and indirectly), to be free from intimidation and violence, and for all forms of treating to be absent.

The following problems were identified in the dialogues:

The impunity of state institutions.

The partisan behaviour of traditional leaders.

The partisan nature of institutions, such as the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), that should be tasked with ensuring Inclusion and Insulation.

The role of youth militia.

Political violence, and all the other methods of inhibiting free participation in elections – intimidation, hate speech, partisan access to resources, and judicial harassment – were all flagged as worsening.

Concerns about the partisan behaviour of traditional leaders, and the frank statements by traditional leaders about support for Zanu PF in flagrant violation of the constitution.

Insulation:

Insulation refers to both the ability to freely register as a voter and to freely vote, which have been problems in most elections in the past two decades. The following problems were identified in the dialogues:

The right to register has been impeded by the difficulty in getting the requisite identity documents necessary for registration as a voter.

Discrimination in favour of rural residents in getting access to identity documents and registering as voters.

Continuous complaints about the allocation of polling stations between rural and urban areas, and often the very long delays for urban voters.

The need to improve the transparency of the counting process and remove the insistence that only ZEC is entitled to publish results.

Little evidence that the recommendations by local and international observers have been taken on board by either Zec or the government.

The role of domestic observers is crucial for the effectiveness of outside observers since few of the latter can provide the breadth of cover or the extended time that can domestic observers.

The Private Voluntary Organisations Act will seriously impede domestic observation through the burdensome conditions imposed on NGOs.

Integrity

Integrity refers to the impartiality and accountability of the election management body, Zec.

Integrity also requires all institutions to evince impartiality and accountability through the entire electoral cycle, covering all the antecedent conditions for the vote, the counting and reporting of the outcome, and through to the transparent and impartial dealing with disputes by the courts.

The following problems were identified in the dialogues:

The lack of independence in Zec remains a significant concern.

There were frequent references to the apparently partisan affiliation of some of the commissioners, and to the presence of staff who have unclear affiliation to the military.

Voter registration remains a concern, both because of the low uptake by citizens and the difficulties in getting identity documents.

The non-availability of the voters’ roll, and the impeding of independent audits remains a problem as in the past.
Voter education remains constrained and unduly controlled.

The failure of best practice on delimitation and an absence of impartiality, equality,

Representativeness, non-discrimination, and transparency.

Irreversibility:

Irreversibility refers to several things.

Firstly, that there is no reversing or tampering with results: the count and the outcome must reflect the will of the people.

Secondly, it refers to the acceptance of the results by the loser. Irreversibility also deals with the judicial process in the management of disputes; effectively the extent to which the courts, both lower and higher, are wholly independent in dealing with disputes.

The following problems were identified in the dialogues:

Partisan judicial processes, both during the pre-election process & in electoral petitions.

Undue delaying of petitions.

Unnecessary & harmful curtailing of petitions.

Weaponizing of the judicial system through spurious prosecutions (Fadzayi Mahere) or denial of bail (Job Sikhala)

Failure to follow through on judgements (Fortune Charumbira and contempt)

A major point in the discussion was over the publication of results and the final authority of Zec in publishing results.

The point was made that once the count has taken place, the returning officer and the party representatives have agreed on the result, and the V11 form is posted outside the polling station, should the general public, the press, and observers not be entitled to collect and collate results as they come in?

This is common practice in many countries, and, as pointed out in one dialogue, occurred in Kenya.

There was disagreement over the desirability of independent collating and reporting on results.

One view was that this is desirable and leads to greater confidence in the electoral process, whilst the contrary view was that this will lead to dispute and be left only to Zec.

An additional point raised was the lack of a transitional mechanism in finalising the election and the establishing the government, as is increasingly the case in many countries.

This describes a set of legal procedures to be followed after the final count, and not merely declaring the winner and swearing in the president.

Conclusion

The objective behind this election policy dialogue series was to arrive at a clear understanding about whether the country was ready to meet national, regional, and international best practices on the holding of elections.

The standards to meeting the criteria of best practice are laid down in the Zimbabwe constitution and the Electoral Act but should also conform to the Sadc Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of the African Union.

There are also the recommendations given repeatedly by international observer groups, by one count 114 of these after the 2018 elections.

The short answer is that this audit suggests that there cannot be any confidence in the forthcoming elections.

The conclusions for each of the pillars is that there are severe deficits for each and every one of these, and the examination of how each pillar reinforces each other amplified this.

In many ways, the pre-election process looks worse than it did in 2018, and many forms of bad electoral practices not seen in the past two elections - in 2013 and 2018 – have returned with memories of the very bad elections in 2000, 2002, and 2008.

This pre-election audit indicates that the conditions for a free and fair election are absent, and there is little possibility that the multiple reforms necessary can be achieved in the little time remaining.

Thus, the kinds of recommendations that can be made must focus on what must be done to deal with a flawed election. There seems little doubt now, with the decision by the Constitutional Court dismissing the application to set aside the delimitation, that elections will take place, underlining the concerns raised in the elections policy dialogue about all the secrecy around setting the date for the elections this year.

If the hopes that an election can cure the coup and restore the country to legitimacy and international re-engagement cannot be met, then the focus must shift to a more political process, and one in which the international community – regional, continental, and international – must play a significant part.

The consequences for Zimbabwe and the region are too serious for it to be business as usual following another failed Zimbabwean election: as pointed out elsewhere, Zimbabwe has reached its “Lancaster” moment.

The desperate citizens deserve better than more form without content, and a serious intervention to lift them from increasing penury and hardship. - Ibbo Mandaza

Ibbo Mandaza is director of the Sapes Trust and Tony Reeler is senior researcher at the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU).

The case of Zimbabwe’s extreme poverty levels

Extreme poverty is defined as a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs while poverty entails the state of being poor.

Although the two are closely related, extreme poverty denotes a situation that is more severe and intense than just poverty.

For the sake of contextualisng, this weekly review defines poverty as two-dimensional.

The first one is poverty and the second one is extreme poverty.

The word extreme poverty is used deliberately to bring to light the scale and magnitude of poverty.

Thus, for the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (Zimcodd) extreme poverty entails an accumulation of insecurities due to one’s failure to enjoy basic human rights such as safe drinking water, food, health, shelter, sanitation, and education culminating in a cycle of poverty passed down from one generation to the other.

Extreme poverty can be natural or man-made as it involves deliberate or unintended social exclusion of citizens.

For the United Nations, is living on less than US$1,90 a day.

Therefore, now that extreme poverty has been contextualised, it is critical to examine the same and ascertain whether it is man-made or a result of circumstances beyond human control.

Food Insecurity: Food insecurity has remained one of the major challenges encountered by Zimbabweans across the country.

According to the 2022 ZimVAC Rural Livelihoods Assessment Report, approximately 38% of rural households are food insecure a number that is greatly disputable if one is to considered that more than half of the entire country is in extreme poverty.

Matabeleland North has the highest food insecurity with 58% of households in need of food support.

Some of the areas within the same province with the most insecure households are Hwange which has 73%, Binga 71%, and Buhera 75%.

The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency supports the above verdict by indicating that, “91% of Zimbabweans can no longer afford protein-rich food such as meat and are largely surviving on vegetables such as rape, covo, and chomolia, among others they can now afford”.

To this end, because the above statistics on food insecurity are mainly generated from state-sponsored or controlled research entities, it is with no doubt that the figures might be greatly conservative.

The situation might be worse than what the government is publishing.

This is because the World Bank ranks Zimbabwe first in the top 10 countries hit hardest by food inflation in the world.

All in all, the question of whether extreme poverty is man-made or not, generates a lot of emotions and controversy.

It is a question that is better understood by one that has been subjected to it.

While according to a 2023 Rapid Poverty Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey by ZimStats states that 40% of the population is exposed to extreme poverty there has not been any form of agency from the government to address the same.

Government social spending has remained wanting with respect to Basic Education Module Assistance, Harmonised Cash Transfer, Child Protection, and Health Assistance Programs to mention but a few

Therefore, bringing to light the question of the government`s sincerity in addressing extreme poverty.

The million-dollar questions become; is the government failing to redress extreme poverty or it is just policy inertia?

Is extreme poverty a manifestation of multifaceted governance miscarriage? Are there any possible actionable interventions that could have been adopted to address extreme poverty?-Zimcodd