Succession to the highest political office in any system or entity can be a moment of calamity, especially in systems where the succession framework is opaque and susceptible to manipulation.
As Zanu PF approaches its 21st national people’s conference, scheduled for October 22 to 27 in Bulawayo, it is crucial to analyse its succession politics and implications.
This conference is set against the backdrop of a brewing succession battle linked to President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s potential third-term bid, supported by a faction within the party.
This week’s Zim-Agora delves into the succession question, widely regarded as one of the most critical topics in Zimbabwean politics, as Zanu PF prepares for its national people’s conference.
Rather than focusing on the constitutional provisions addressing succession within Zanu PF, this paper will examine the political dynamics that overcast these provisions.
By analysing the political undercurrents surrounding succession in ZanuPF, this paper will also compare how other nationalist parties in the Sadc region have tackled this contentious issue. A cursory look at leadership renewal in Sadc liberation movements will underscore the significance of succession in Zanu PF, highlighting the historical parallels among these political parties.
By examining these dynamics, we can better understand the significance of succession in Zanu PF and the broader implications for political stability in Zimbabwe.
Many liberation movements in the Sadc region have gone through the inevitable dual test, that is: how to manage the leadership succession question while balancing the political stability and socio-economic transformation expected there from.
The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa has had four presidents since the attainment of majority rule in 1994.
Similarly, Frelimo in Mozambique has seen four presidents since its formation in 1975, and Swapo in Namibia has had four presidents since 1990.
Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania has had six leaders, while the MPLA in Angola and ZanuPF in Zimbabwe have each had only two.
However, Zanu PF has been embroiled in a fierce power struggle since the ousting of former president Robert Mugabe in a military coup in November 2017.
This instability highlights the challenges faced by parties with less transparent and more manipulable succession frameworks.
Nationalist parties in the Sadc region have approached succession with varying degrees of success and stability.
The ANC in South Africa, for instance, has managed relatively smooth transitions between its leaders, maintaining internal cohesion despite occasional factional disputes.
Frelimo in Mozambique and Swapo in Namibia have similarly navigated leadership changes without major disruptions, reflecting a structured approach to succession.
In contrast, Zanu PF has struggled with succession, particularly evident in the power vacuum and internal conflicts following Mugabe’s removal. This instability highlights the challenges faced by parties with less transparent and more manipulable succession frameworks.
Leadership renewal in Sadc liberation movements is crucial for maintaining political stability and continuity.
The historical parallels among these parties, such as their origins in liberation struggles and their long-standing dominance in their respective countries, highlights the importance of effective succession planning.
For Zanu PF, learning from the experiences of its regional counterparts could provide valuable insights into managing leadership transitions more effectively.
So, what is fundamentally wrong with Zanu PF and Zimbabwe? Such an analysis commands a retracing of the political history of state building in the post-independence period and how succession has influenced both party and national politics.
It is also essential to pay attention to post independence political system and the political culture of Zimbabwe.
Heywood (2002:26) notes that a political system is a subsystem of the larger social system. It is a system in that it is characterised by interrelationships within a complex whole, and political in the sense that these interrelationships relate to the distribution of power, wealth and resources in society.
Since independence, Zanu PF and to some extent Zimbabwe have been built around a dominant role of an enigmatic leader, Mugabe, and has drawn whatever ideological character it has influenced by the views of the president.
Other nationalist parties have successfully renewed their leadership grounded on policy-making embedded in strong state institutions and internal party democracy where decision-making is consensual.
However, this is in stark contrast to Zanu PF and Zimbabwe where at state level the institutions are feeble and there exists a unambiguous supremacy of the executive and strong organic bureaucracy that is subservient to the political leadership.
Burling (1974) establishes two hypothetical assertions of political succession which are critical to explaining succession in Zanu PF.
One, the absence of a clearly defined successor is an important source of political instability; and two, centralization (of power) provokes succession struggles and sows seeds of its own demise.
The absence of a defined successor and the centralization of state power in one person has propagated personal rule in Zimbabwe.
Thompson (2004:127) defines personal rule as a system of government where one individual, commanding the heights of state institutions and patron–client networks, enjoys a virtual monopoly on all formal political activity within a territory.
Personal rule has created a big-man syndrome which Bratton and van de Walle (2002:63), refer to as the dominance of one individual or group of individuals who strive to exert or achieve absolute rule or control over others deemed as ‘subjects’.
Addressing the question of succession in such contexts is mammoth.
In addition, characteristics of personal rule are; state led by one dominant charismatic individual; state institutions and authority treated as private, rather than public, property; relies on clientelism to generate legitimacy throughout society; ostentatious display of wealth by leaders; arbitrary rule replaces the rule of law; factional competition rife within ruling elite ;
Inefficient government, more about nurturing the client–patron network 4 than managing public policy.
In personal rule there is also no distinction between the individual and the office they occupy.
This produces a political environment of factionalism, splits, purges and coups.
The deliberately scrawny legal-rational system established after independence has led to Zimbabwe becoming a centralized state.
Thompson (2004:121) asserts that the characteristics of a centralized state are: accumulation of power in the executive branch, often in the office of the president or prime minister; political mobilisation initially through just one official party that is ultimately sidelined; civil society excluded from influencing state decision-making; sources of political opposition co-opted, harassed or eliminated; limited respect for human rights; absence of competitive elections; local government, parliament and the judiciary by-passed by the ruling elite; strong security laws at the disposal of state leaders; state plays a dominant role in the economy, elements of a command economy; state often led by one dominant charismatic individual exercising personal rule; and, legitimacy generated by neo-patrimonialism and clientelism.
All these characteristics are prevalent in Zimbabwe although with varying degrees of how they are exercised.
Personal rule and the big-man syndrome in Zimbabwe have led to a Mugabeism and ED pfee syndrome ,which is at the heart of the succession problematic. The Crisis in Zimbabwe paper (2015:42) brings out four phenomena resulting from Mugabeism which are; Zanu equals Mugabe; Mugabe equals Zanu PF; Mugabe equals Zimbabwe and Mugabe equals Zanu PF and Zimbabwe.
This syndrome has been carried over by the incumbent leader Mnangagwa, hence the current efforts to change the constitution to allow him to go for an unconstitutional third term in power. In post-colonial Africa, personal rulers have ignored rules, bent rules, and made new rules to serve their own interests.
The rules of the game are often changed overnight. The nocturnal changes to Zanu PF’s constitutional provisions dealing with nominations to the presidium and the structure of the politburo during the December 2014 congress is a true case in point.
In this manner, even presidential monarch’s own followers are kept offbalance.
Although the system of government cannot be managed by just one person, instead of building legal-rational institutions to carry out the duties of the state, patrimonial leaders allocate offices as patronage among close relatives, friends and clients.
As a result, all these officials have to demonstrate personal loyalty to the leader in order to maintain office.
In this respect, clients are retainers tied to their benefactor, rather than salaried officials serving the government institutions in which they are employed.