SA’s post-electoral coalition has implications for Zim

ON Wednesday, our neighbour just south of Limpopo had what analysts are characterising as the most important polls since 1994.

This is because the ruling party, ANC is projected to poll below 50% in the national election. This has been a long time coming after it has been on a gradual downward trend since its pinnacle during the Mbeki era.

Political scientists have long demonstrated that liberation movements often lose power 30 years after independence.

It is the first time the ANC will wade into coalition territory at the national level since the Government of National Unity in 1994. This reality has been staring South Africans in the face and the government has had to initiate a national dialogue on coalitions to develop a framework for coalition governments from local to national level.

Municipal coalitions were a precursor

If the chaos in municipal coalitions was a harbinger of what was to come at the national level, then such a framework is not only necessary but indispensable.

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They have largely failed the litmus test at that level and failure at the national level would be disastrous. Of course, coalitions are always difficult and need deft handling. Interesting as it may be, I will not delve into the entrails of coalitions right now. My interest is in the implications for Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans of the eventual electoral outcomes.

I explore this from the perspective of the disruption of the ANC government’s stance on Zimbabwe. which has become predictable over the decades.

A coalition government in South Africa will disrupt that status quo and likely result in a policy shift towards Harare. The extent and scope of the likely shifts will be determined by which coalition arrangement wins the day.

Zimbabwe(an)’s interests

The interests of Zimbabwe(ans), which hang in the balance of post-electoral coalition government in Pretoria are at two levels. One is on a political level within the ambit of international relations at government-to-government and party-to-party levels for both the ruling parties and the opposition.

The second implication is at a citizen level considering that Zimbabweans make up the bulk of immigrants in South Africa and their status has been subject to political and legal contestations over the past four years.

The ANC government's posture towards the Zanu PF government has always been within the fraternal relations of liberation movements. This strong brotherhood is characterised by a see no evil, speak no evil approach. At least in public.

This is a relic of the frontline states platform in which these parties cooperated closely to liberate the region. In recent history, this has been demonstrated in three key moments.

Firstly, the Mbeki mediation outcome of 2008 on Zimbabwe’s political crisis is seen as having been aimed at resurrecting Zanu PF after it lost the plebiscite. The resultant power-sharing deal put Zanu PF back in the driver's seat and enabled it to re-consolidate power.

The ghost of the Sadc tribunal

The second moment was South Africa’s active participation in the disbandment of the Sadc Tribunal after its 2008 ruling that the Zimbabwean government’s fast track land reform programme violated the Sadc Treaty principles on non-discrimination and the rule of law.

While Cyril Ramaphosa later withdrew South Africa’s signature in 2019, the support given then had achieved its purpose.

Lastly, the posture of the South African government and the ANC towards Zimbabwe’s 2023 disputed elections demonstrating unwavering support to the Harare administration has also been a clear case of standing shoulder-to-shoulder with a fellow liberation party.

Of course, Pretoria’s policy towards the perceived excesses of Zanu PF has not been without internal discord. But the fraternal considerations of the liberation movements have always triumphed.

Zimbabwean immigrants

One important aspect of the outcomes of the post-election political framework is the issue of worker’s permits for Zimbabweans in South Africa.

The past four years have seen serious political and legal contestation on the matter. The ANC appeared to take a strong posture on the issue of undocumented migrants refusing to extend the dispensation and later backing down and making some concessions.

Other political parties joined in the fray. Some radical fringe parties pursued a hard-line stance akin to xenophobia while others advocated for better border control.

Others advocated for open borders. For a moment it appeared as if this would be a big election issue, but it later lost currency.

While this has not become a major election issue, it will become a major policy issue for the government that emerges after this election.

The likely coalitions and their implication

It is still early days but any political pundit worth their weight can already see the possibilities of post-election coalitions and how the pendulum is likely to swing.

I will not go into the trouble of exploring the implications of every possible coalition arrangement, but I will only focus on the three most likely.

ANC-IFP et al coalition

This coalition is the most likely if the ANC garners above 45% votes. It is also one that makes the most political sense for the ANC.

While their manifestoes may not be similar, they are not incompatible either, except for the Inkatha Freedom Party's (IFP) proposition of more powers for traditional leaders.

That would hardly be a deal breaker. The ANC is not likely to lose future support from its members based on this coalition and the same goes for IFP.

Granted, the IFP might shed some support to Zuma’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in its stronghold in KwaZulu Natal (KZN) in the future if its supporters interpret its coalition arrangement as a betrayal of Jacob Zuma. But the MK seems to be one of those one-election parties.

For the ANC, the IFP is the least problematic partner to manage considering power dynamics.

The IFP needs this coalition for political survival as its growth prospects have not been convincing lately.

On the whole, the IFP is not likely to cause much disruption or discomfort in the ANC’s foreign policy direction.

This is where Zimbabwe’s government and Zanu PF are concerned. The IFP has in the past refrained from commenting strongly about Zimbabwean politics and might not care much about the ANC’s posture.

The same applies to the immigrants' issue. As far as Zimbabwe(ans) is concerned, this is the best coalition for its interests to see minimal disruption.

If both parties still do not manage 50%, they will have to gain support from smaller parties just to cross the threshold. But that is a recipe for an unstable coalition because losing one small partner will result in chaos.

The ANC-DA coalition

The ANC and Democratic Alliance (DA) while they have a few contrary policy positions, particularly on the National Health Insurance (NHI) bill, have manifestos that are less contrary.

This coalition is likely and second-best option for ANC if political costs are not taken into consideration.

It also brings together two political parties with governing experience as the DA has been at the helm in Western Cape for over two decades.

The coalition would be a stable one over the long term.

However, it comes with huge political costs on both sides. The DA hardliners might find the coalition a betrayal of its mostly white Afrikaans and white capital support base.

The ANC hardliners might also see it as a betrayal of radical policy propositions like expropriation of land, which is mostly held by white farmers.

In this case, both risk losing supporters to more radical political parties on both sides of the spectrum.

But if they present the coalition as a formula to stop the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), then they may not be punished by their supporters. Both parties have shared interests to stop the EFF.

DA would be happy to remain the main opposition and the ANC would not like the EFF to continue bleeding it of its support base as well as occupying its traditional policy space.

An uneasy coalition

This would also be an uneasy coalition on foreign policy. Both parties have contrary views on almost every foreign policy issue. From Russia and China to the United States of America, they have polar positions. Zimbabwe comes into focus here.

The DA has strongly and incessantly condemned the ANC stance on Zanu PF and has openly and consistently given solidarity and support to the opposition.

On the other hand, the ANC has on occasion labelled the opposition in Zimbabwe as ‘puppets of the West.’

When it comes to the foreign policy  discourse of an ANC-DA coalition, my kinspeople would say, “unosungilikanya mbwa nemimwise” (it is akin to tying two dogs together by their tails).

But then coalitions are an arena for policy concessions. The ANC can concede and allow the coalition government to toughen its stance towards Zanu PF to the detriment of the Harare administration.

Or the DA could be the one to concede and the Zimbabwean opposition might lose a key voice in the region. Or yet still, both parties might avoid the subject and agree to maintain their positions and the status quo remains.

For Zimbabwean migrants, this coalition might gravitate towards policy proposals that tighten immigration policy and border control.

The permits issue might be on the agenda again and both parties seem to have similar policy inclinations on the matter.

These inclinations do not spell much of a positive turn of fortunes for Zimbabweans in South Africa. Nothing to write home about for them.

The ANC-EFF coalition

The EFF has made it clear from the onset that it will be willing to get into a coalition with the ANC. The ANC has also not ruled that out.  This coalition, if it materialises is likely to be the most mercurial.

 It could be marred by instability and incessant bickering if the posture of the EFF in Parliament and municipal coalitions is anything to go by.

Already the EFF has made it clear that it would ask for the Vice-presidency and the Finance Ministry in such a coalition. An untenable ask for the ANC.

The red berets will push the envelope in radical policy changes relating to the nationalization of mines, and expropriation of land amongst other positions.

Such a coalition will be politically profitable for the EFF as it demonstrates that it can acquire and exercise power.

For the ANC, it will be very costly as it gives its offshoot which has been haemorrhaging its support base a platform to gain traction and access to state resources.

Of course, both parties are already in sync on their policy toward Russia and China. They, however, diverge on relations with the USA.

When it comes to Zimbabwe, the EFF has been measured in its criticism of Zanu PF, perhaps for the deep respect that Julius Malema seems to have for Robert Mugabe.

But he has shown no affinity for the current Zanu PF leadership. His support for the opposition has also been measured. This coalition’s stance towards Zimbabwe would be pragmatic with positions established on an issue-by-issue basis.

For Zimbabweans in South Africa, this would be their dream coalition. Malema’s strong stance on open borders and on letting Zimbabwean migrants work freely in South Africa seems unwavering.

The ANC on the other hand has been blowing hot and cold on the issue and might be willing to make a concession to the EFF on the issue of permits for Zimbabweans.

The sober view

The ANC has the untenable position of determining which coalition will result in the least political cost. Whichever way one looks at it, the post-electoral pact should the ANC not get 50% of the vote will impact Zimbabwe(ans). For now, we watch the space.

This is my sober view; I take no prisoners.

• Dumani is an independent political analyst. He writes in his personal capacity.  — X @NtandoDumani